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OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
John J. Koresko, V (“Koresko”), Regional Employers’ Assurance Leagues,
Delaware Valley League, Penn-Mont Benefit Services, Inc. (“Penn Mont”), and Koresko
& Associates (together, “Respondents”), appeal two sets of orders issued by the District
Court.  In the first set of orders, the “enforcement orders,” the District Court granted the
Department of Labor (“DOL”)’s Petition to Enforce Administrative Subpoenas (“May 11
Order”), rejected Respondents’ privilege claims and ordered Respondents to comply with
the subpoenas (“August 23 Order”).  The second set of orders, the “contempt orders,”
denied DOL’s Renewed Motion for Adjudication of Contempt (“January 10 Order”),
adjudged Respondents Koresko, Penn-Mont and Koresko & Associates (the “Contempt
Respondents”) in contempt, ordered them to pay compensatory costs and coercive fines
(“March 17 Orders”), and directed the Contempt Respondents to pay $5,312.50 to DOL
in compensation for fees and costs associated with the contempt proceedings (“April 25
Order”).
3Respondents raise myriad issues on appeal.  We address their arguments with
respect to the enforcement orders and the contempt orders separately below.  Because we
conclude that none of Respondents’ contentions rises to the level of legal error or abuse
of the District Court’s discretion, we will affirm all of the District Court’s orders.
As we write solely for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the
procedural history of this case, we will discuss only the legal issues presented and related
material facts.
I.  The Enforcement Orders
The District Court had jurisdiction over the subpoena enforcement proceedings
under section 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 49, as made applicable
by section 504(c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1134(c), and section 502(e)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).  District court orders
enforcing administrative subpoenas are final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
because “‘there is no ongoing judicial proceeding that would be delayed by an appeal.’” 
Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J. v. Corigan, 347 F.3d 57, 63 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In
re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 346 (4th Cir. 2000)).
Respondents challenge both of the District Court’s enforcement orders.  First, they
argue that District Court’s grant of DOL’s Petition to Enforce Administrative Subpoenas
in its May 11 Order was improper.  Second, they dispute the District Court’s rejection of
their privilege claims in its August 23 Order.  We address each of these issues in turn.
4A.  The District Court’s Order Enforcing the Administrative Subpoenas
We review a district court’s order enforcing administrative subpoenas for abuse of
discretion.  FDIC v. Wentz, 55 F.3d 905, 908 (3d Cir. 1995).  The procedure for
enforcing administrative subpoenas is well established.  First, the agency must
demonstrate, through affidavits of its agents, that its subpoena meets the threshold
requirements for enforcement, SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118,
128 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc):  “(1) the inquiry must be within the authority of the agency,
(2) the demand for production must not be too indefinite, and (3) the information sought
must be reasonably relevant to the authorized inquiry.”  United States v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 574 (3d Cir. 1980).  “If the government makes this preliminary
showing, the burden then shifts to the respondent to prove that enforcement of the
subpoena would be improper . . . .”  Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 648 F.2d at 128.  Enforcement
of a subpoena is improper where it would amount to an abuse of the court’s process. 
Powell v. United States, 379 U.S. 49, 58 (1964).  “Such an abuse would take place if the
[subpoena] had been issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass the [respondent] or
to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on
the good faith of the particular investigation.”  Id.  After each party has had an
opportunity to argue its position, the District Judge may direct further proceedings,
including discovery, if she concludes that the record is inadequate to make a final
decision.  On the other hand, if the judge finds that the record is sufficient, she may grant
5or deny the petition for enforcement.  At all times during this procedure, the respondent
“bear[s] the initial burden of convincing the trial judge that the claimed abuse of process
is not frivolous.”  Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 648 F.2d at 128.
Respondents raise three main objections to the District Court’s enforcement of
DOL’s subpoenas.  First, they argue that the District Court improperly relied on
“conclusory” statements to find that the subpoenas satisfied the threshold enforcement
criteria.  Second, they contend that the District Court applied the wrong standard in
evaluating their claim that DOL’s investigation was improperly motivated.  Third, they
assert that the District Court erred in refusing to inquire into DOL’s statutory authority to
issue the subpoenas.  As we explain below, we conclude that the District Court’s grant of 
DOL’s petition to enforce its subpoenas was proper in all respects.
In this case, DOL supported its Petition for Enforcement with a declaration from
Investigator Bindu A. George, and the District Court found that the declaration satisfied
DOL’s obligation to establish that its subpoenas met the threshold requirements for
enforcement.  Chao v. Koresko, No. 04-MC-74, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2004). 
Respondents argue that the District Court improperly relied on the “conclusory”
statements in Investigator George’s declaration.  As described above, however, our
standard administrative subpoena enforcement procedure specifically contemplates that
an agency will use affidavits or sworn declarations to satisfy its initial burden.  See
Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 648 F.2d at 128.  Moreover, weighing the sufficiency of the parties’
    Judge Weis considers the request for production of thousands of employee1
applications for insurance which include medical and personal information to be unduly
burdensome and would deny DOL’s requests as to those documents.
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submissions is precisely the type of decision that is committed to the District Court’s
discretion.  Although we wonder how DOL could possibly need all of the documents it
has listed in its subpoenas, we find no basis for concluding that the District Court abused
its discretion in this first phase of the enforcement analysis.1
In the second phase of its enforcement analysis, the District Court evaluated
Respondents claims that DOL was improperly motivated and concluded that, even
assuming the facts that Respondents alleged were true, Respondents had failed to meet
their burden of establishing that DOL was acting in bad faith or for an improper purpose. 
Koresko, No. 04-MC-74, slip op. at 4-5.  Respondents contend that the District Court
erred by applying the standard from United States v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 831
F.2d 1142, 1145-47 (D.C. Cir. 1987), which held that a respondent had to show that the
agency was acting in bad faith or for an improper purpose to overcome the agency’s
prima facie enforcement showing, id. at 1145, rather than analyzing their claims under the
framework that we laid out in Wheeling-Pittsburgh, which allows that a respondent might
be able to establish that enforcement of a subpoena would abuse the court’s process even
where the respondent fails to demonstrate bad faith.  648 F.2d at 125.  Respondents’
contention lacks merit.  Even if we were to find that Wheeling-Pittsburgh articulates a
broader standard than Aero Mayflower, the outcome of the case would not change–the
7District Court has already determined that the facts alleged by Respondents do not meet
the Wheeling-Pittsburgh standard.  Although the District Court’s analysis was framed in
terms of “bad faith” and “improper purpose,” the District Court compared the facts
alleged by Respondents to those alleged in Wheeling-Pittsburgh on its way to finding that
Respondents’ claims were insufficiently troubling to warrant further investigation.  See
Koresko, No. 04-MC-74, slip op. at 5 (“Even assuming that the investigation was
prompted by a complaint by SCM, that fact does not rise to the level of bad faith or
improper purpose by the agency.  See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 1981).”).  Under these circumstances,
we cannot find that the District Court abused its discretion in the second phase of the
enforcement analysis.
Respondents’ argument that the District Court erred by failing to inquire into
DOL’s jurisdiction to investigate Respondents is similarly unfounded.  As the District
Court properly pointed out, the agency is not required to establish jurisdiction as an
element of its prima facie case.  Koresko, No. 04-MC-74, slip op. at 3 (quoting Donovan
v. Shaw, 668 F.3d 985, 989 (8th Cir. 1982)).  The case that Respondents cite to support
their position, EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984), is inapposite here because it is
based on Title VII.  Title VII, unlike ERISA, requires a valid charge of discrimination as
a prerequisite to an EEOC investigation.  A case decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit considering a subpoena issued by DOL pursuant to ERISA provides a
    The Court allowed limited redaction of law firm bills to delete attorney-client2
privileged or work product-protected information and insurance forms to protect personal
health and medical information.  Chao v. Koresko, No. 04-MC-74 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23,
2004).
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better comparison.  The court there noted that “[i]t is well-settled that a subpoena
enforcement proceeding is not the proper forum in which to litigate the question of
coverage under a particular federal statute,” Donovan, 668 F.2d at 989 (citations omitted),
and concluded that the district court’s refusal to entertain the respondent’s defense of lack
of coverage under the statute was proper.  Id.  Similarly, here, the District Court found
that DOL had established a prima facie case for enforcement.  Because coverage by the
statute is not an element of DOL’s prima facie case, and lack of coverage is not a defense
to enforcement, the District Court’s failure to inquire into DOL’s jurisdiction to
investigate Respondents was proper.
In sum, none of the issues that Respondents raise regarding the District Court’s
enforcement of DOL’s subpoenas amounts to an abuse of discretion.  We will accordingly
affirm the District Court’s May 11 Order.
B.  Respondents’ Privilege Claims
Respondents assert that many of the documents requested by DOL in its subpoenas
are covered by various privileges.  After reviewing Respondents’ privilege log and
various “samples” of the allegedly privileged documents, the District Court rejected
Respondents’ privilege claims.   The Court expressed frustration with Respondents’2
9submissions and concluded that they should not be allowed more time to support their
claims.  Chao v. Koresko, No. 04-MC-74, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2004).  On
appeal, Respondents contest the District Court’s legal finding that the statutory tax
preparer privilege does not apply to this dispute, the Court’s factual findings as to the
applicability of the attorney-client and other privileges to the requested documents, and
the District Court’s refusal to allow Respondents to supplement their initial privilege
submission.  We reject all of Respondents’ arguments and conclude that the District
Court’s privilege decisions were proper.
Our review of the District Court’s determinations as to the scope of asserted
privileges is plenary.  United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 809 (3d Cir. 1984).  We
agree with the District Court’s that the tax preparer privilege does not apply here.  The
language of the statute is clear–the “privilege” “may only be asserted in–(A) any
noncriminal tax matter before the Internal Revenue Service; and (B) any noncriminal tax
proceeding in Federal court brought by or against the United States.”  26 U.S.C. §
7525(a)(2) (emphasis added).  This case, a civil proceeding by DOL to enforce an
administrative subpoena, is neither.  Respondents’ primary concern seems to be that DOL
will share information it receives with the IRS, but they have not cited any authority that
expands the tax preparer privilege beyond its express statutory limits.  Because this
proceeding is clearly outside of the statutory bounds of the tax preparer privilege, we
conclude that the privilege is inapplicable here.
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Determinations of the applicability of privileges to particular documents are
committed to the District Judge’s discretion.  Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d
452, 477 n.16 (3d Cir. 1998).  The burden rests upon the party who claims that requested
documents are privileged to “describe the nature of the documents . . . in a manner that . .
. will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.”  Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).  In this case, the District Court specifically found that Respondents
had failed to carry that burden:  
[T]he respondents have not supported their claims with the kind of specific
information that is required.  The Court cannot tell what documents the
respondents claim are protected by what privilege[s], by whom the document
was prepared, from whom and to whom it was sent, and why it is a privileged
communication.
Koresko, No. 04-MC-74, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2004).  Respondents have
attempted to relitigate the privilege issues before us, explaining why they think that
various privileges apply to various documents.  Their arguments establish only that they
disagree with the District Court’s decision; they do not establish that the District Court’s
ruling was incorrect or that the Court abused its discretion in any way.  We will not
disturb that ruling.
Finally, Respondents argue that the District Court “should have” allowed them
more time to clarify their privilege submissions and provide additional information.  Like
determinations of whether the privilege applies, decisions as to the amount of information
that the District Court needs in order to make such determinations are committed to the
11
District Judge’s discretion.  Cf. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.3d 855, 863-64 (8th
Cir. 1956) (finding that district court has “discretion or latitude in the receiving of proof”
on questions of waiver of attorney-client privilege).  The District Court in this case “spent
hours” evaluating Respondents’ privilege claims, Koresko, No. 04-MC-74, slip op. at 5
(Aug. 2, 2004), and allowed Respondents the opportunity to present their privilege claims
both orally and in writing.  Id. at 4.  The Court concluded that Respondents were “unable .
. . to state with any precision why any of the documents are privileged.”  Id.  Given the
circumstances, we find that the District Court acted well within its discretion when it
declined to give Respondents a third opportunity to advance their privilege claims.  
Because Respondents have failed to show that the District Court committed a legal
error or abused its discretion with respect to the applicability of privilege to the
subpoenaed documents, we will affirm the District Court’s August 23 Order.
II.  The Contempt Orders
Respondents challenge the District Court’s March 17 contempt orders by arguing
(1) that the Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the orders; (2) that the District Court
violated Respondents’ procedural due process rights in the contempt proceedings; (3) that
the District Court erred in ignoring Respondents’ defenses to the contempt charges; and
(4) that the relief awarded by the District Court, in the form of compensatory costs and
coercive fines, was improper.  We address each argument in turn.
A.  Jurisdiction
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Respondents argue that the appeals that they filed from the District Court’s May
11, August 23 and January 10 Orders divested the District Court of jurisdiction over
further contempt proceedings.  But the general rule on which Respondents rely, that filing
a notice of appeal immediately transfers jurisdiction from a district court to a court of
appeals, is subject to a number of exceptions that apply in this case.  See generally 20
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 303.32[1] (3d ed. 1999).  For
example, the district court retains authority to enforce a judgment that has not been
stayed.  Id. § 303.32[2][c][vi].  The District Court thus properly denied DOL’s Motion for
Adjudication of Civil Contempt on January 10, deferring enforcement of its May 11 and
August 23 Orders until Respondents’ Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of
its stay application were denied.  Chao v. Koresko, No. 04-MC-74 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10,
2005).  Once the stay was finally denied, the District Court retained jurisdiction to
enforce its May 11 and August 23 orders.  
Respondents’ appeal of the District Court’s January 10 Order did not divest the
District Court of that jurisdiction.  A district court may proceed with a case if an appeal is
filed from a non-appealable order.  20 Moore’s Federal Practice § 303.32[2][b][iv][B]. 
“Civil contempt becomes appealable only when the contemnor has refused to comply
with the remedial order and the court has exercised its authority either to punish or to
coerce compliance.”  U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fraternal Ass’n of Steel Haulers, 601 F.2d 1269,
1273 (3d Cir. 1979).  The District Court’s January 10 Order was not appealable–it simply
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denied DOL’s contempt motion and outlined the penalties for any future failures to
comply with the Court’s August 23 Order.  As of January 10, then, the Court had not
“exercised its authority either to punish or to coerce compliance.”  Thus, Respondents’
appeal of the January 10 Order could not disturb the District Court’s jurisdiction to
enforce its May 11 and August 23 Orders.  The District Court therefore retained
jurisdiction to enter the March 17 Orders adjudging Respondents Koresko, Koresko &
Associates and Penn-Mont in contempt.
B.  Respondents’ Procedural Due Process Arguments
Respondents contend that the District Court deprived them of their due process
rights when it “prospectively” adjudged them in contempt in its January 10 Order and
failed to give them adequate opportunity to explain in the hearings that led up to its
March 17 Orders.  Respondents rely on Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121 (3d Cir.
1990), to support their due process theory.  In that case, the district court issued an order
providing for the imposition of fines if the parties failed to settle by a court-imposed
deadline.  Id. at 1124.  When the parties failed to meet the deadline, the court
“summarily” and without a hearing imposed fines on defendants and defendants’ counsel.
Id.  We reversed and instructed the district court to vacate the fines because the district
court had failed to provide the parties with “customary procedural safeguards [to] ensure
that the parties or their attorneys have an opportunity to explain the conduct deemed
deficient before the fine is imposed and that a record will be available to facilitate
14
appellate review.”  Id. at 1127.  
The comparison of this case to Newton is inept.  Whereas the district court in
Newton imposed fines before any hearing, the District Court here provided Respondents
with two opportunities to explain themselves, at hearings on January 7 and March 16,
before it imposed any sanctions.  Transcripts were made of those hearings and included in
the record for appellate review.  The due process standard that we articulated for
contempt proceedings in Newton requires no more.
C.  Respondents’ Contempt Defenses
We review a district court’s contempt findings for abuse of discretion.  United
States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 725 (3d Cir. 1993).  Abuse of discretion “may be
established by showing an error of law or a clearly erroneous judgment or finding of
fact.”  Id.  Respondents have not challenged the merits of the District Court’s contempt
findings, so we will not review them here.  Instead, Respondents argue that the District
Court committed errors of law when it declined to consider Respondents’ “substantial
compliance” defense and rejected Respondents’ offer to produce privileged documents
with various protections.  We disagree.
The District Court was under no obligation to consider Respondents’ substantial
compliance defense.  As Respondents themselves acknowledge, we have never
recognized substantial compliance as a defense to civil contempt.  See Robin Woods, Inc.
v. Woods, 28 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1994).  Courts that have recognized this defense
15
define it as follows:
[S]ubstantial compliance with a court order is a defense to an action for civil
contempt.  If a violating party has taken “all reasonable steps” to comply
with the court order, technical or inadvertent violations of the order will not
support a finding of civil contempt.
General Signal Corp. v. Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).  We need not consider here whether we should recognize the
substantial compliance defense in the future, because even if we were to recognize
substantial compliance as a defense to contempt, it would not apply to Respondents.  See
Robin Woods, 28 F.3d at 399.  Respondents’ failure to disclose the documents in this
case is neither “technical” nor “inadvertent.”  Respondents have acknowledged that they
have documents responsive to the subpoena, but have repeatedly declined to produce
them.  Although they sincerely believe that some of the documents covered by the
subpoenas are protected by privilege, that belief does not excuse their failure to comply
with the District Court’s order.  “[G]ood faith is not a defense to civil contempt.”  Id.
Nor was the District Court required to accept Respondents’ offer to produce
purportedly privileged documents with “protections.”  The District Court had already
ruled on the merits of Respondents’ privilege claims, and Respondents’ applications to
stay the District Court’s order to produce the documents had been denied both by the
District Court and by us.  The District Court was therefore free to enforce its order. 
Respondents’ attempts to produce the documents in redacted or “protected” form amounts
to nothing more than an attempt to relitigate the privilege issue and was therefore
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properly disregarded by the District Court.  See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752,
756 (1983) (“‘[A] contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or
factual basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed and thus become a retrial of the
original controversy.’” (quoting Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 69 (1948))).
D.  The Relief Awarded
The District Court ordered Respondents to pay $5,312.50 in compensation for
attorneys’ fees (calculated at a rate of $250 per hour) and costs associated with filing
DOL’s contempt motion, Chao v. Koresko, No. 04-MC-74 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2005), and
a coercive fine of $250 per day beginning January 26, 2005.  Chao v. Koresko, No. 04-
MC-74 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2005).  Respondents argue that the District Court erred as a
matter of law in both awards.  First, they assert that the Court erroneously awarded DOL
costs for motions that it lost and improperly assessed attorneys’ fees for DOL’s attorneys
at a rate comparable to that billed by attorneys in private practice.  Second, they argue that
the coercive fine is “preempted” by ERISA.  We review a district court’s civil contempt
sanctions for abuse of the court’s “wide discretion in fashioning a remedy.”  Del. Valley
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 478 (3d Cir. 1982).
The District Court’s award of compensatory costs was proper.  The final amount
awarded included fees and costs associated with both the January 7 and March 16
hearings.  Although it is true that the Court denied DOL’s contempt motion after the
January 7 hearing, it did so for a purely technical reason–because we had not yet denied
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Respondents’ Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of its stay applications. 
When the District Court ultimately granted DOL’s motion in its March 17 Orders, it
relied on evidence adduced at both the January 7 and the March 16 hearings.  In addition,
the District Court’s April 25 Order indicates that Respondents failed to object to DOL’s
submissions supporting its request for attorneys’ fees when they had the opportunity. 
Koresko, No. 04-MC-74 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2005).  Respondents have thus failed to
advance any basis for finding that the District Court abused its discretion in awarding fees
and costs associated with both hearings.  Nor have they established that the District
Court’s award of fees at the rate of $250 per hour was excessive.  We have expressly
authorized district courts to value government attorneys’ time at market rates for the
purpose of awarding sanctions.  See Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents,
Employees, or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1092-93 (3d Cir. 1988).  We will accordingly
affirm the District Court’s April 25 Order.
Respondents’ argument that the District Court erred in ordering them to pay
coercive fines is similarly unavailing.  According to Respondents, the provision of ERISA
that sets statutory penalties for the failure of “plan administrators” to produce information
to DOL at $100 per day limited the District Court’s authority to order coercive fines in its
contempt proceedings.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(6).  But the provision that Respondents
cite speaks only to the authority of the Secretary of DOL to assess civil penalties against
ERISA plan administrators; nowhere does it evince an intent to limit a district court’s
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discretion to fashion appropriate remedies in contempt proceedings.  We conclude that
the $250 per day fine imposed by the District Court in this case was well within the
District Court’s discretion.
Because none of the arguments that Respondents raise on appeal demonstrates that
the District Court abused its discretion or committed legal error during the enforcement or
contempt proceedings, we will affirm the District Court’s May 11 and August 23 Orders
enforcing DOL’s subpoenas and the District Court’s March 17 and April 25 Orders
adjudging Respondents Koresko, Koresko & Associates and Penn-Mont in contempt and
ordering them to pay coercive fines and compensatory costs.
                                     
